A Taxonomy of State Constitutional Postures Under Authoritarian Capture
Oppositional Federalism
What Pennsylvania built in 1842, every American state can build now.
Christopher Armitage
Publisher, The Existentialist Republic · Owner and Editor in Chief, Gavel Grab
The next hour
The Constitution already holds every tool a state needs to refuse a captured federal government, build around it, prosecute its officers and outlast it. This lecture is the map.
1 · Two abductions
Portland in 2020 and York County in 1837 made two different choices.
2 · The condition
What political science calls it, and why the scholarship expects states to lose.
3 · The vocabulary
Twenty-four terms, each defined in one breath.
4 · The five tiers
Each with its doctrine and its record from 1798 to 2026.
5 · Tier Three in depth
Two sovereigns, the pardon wall, the two-prong test, and who stopped the past prosecutions.
6 · The doctrine
Five bodies of settled law, built mostly by conservative justices.
7 · The structure
Tiers, domains, actors, and the deployment surface they produce together.
8 · Objections and the close
Ten objections answered, the limits, what we learned, and what to ask your officials.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism: A Taxonomy of State Constitutional Postures Under Authoritarian Capture, SSRN (2026)
Portland, Oregon · July 15, 2020
Federal agents pulled Mark Pettibone into an unmarked minivan, and Oregon answered with a federal lawsuit.
Shortly after 2 a.m., four or five men in camouflage grabbed Pettibone as he walked home from a protest and drove him, his own beanie pulled over his eyes, to the garage of the federal courthouse. Oregon’s attorney general filed a federal lawsuit within two days. Seven days later a federal judge denied the restraining order, holding that the state lacked standing.
Not one agent was ever charged.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part I; Oregon Department of Justice
York County, Pennsylvania · April 1, 1837
Pennsylvania prosecuted the slave catcher who seized Margaret Morgan, and a state court convicted him of kidnapping.
Edward Prigg, a slave catcher from Maryland, seized Margaret Morgan and her children and took them back across the line. She had lived in Pennsylvania for five years, and at least one of her children was born there, presumptively free under Pennsylvania law. On May 22, 1839, the Court of Quarter Sessions of York County convicted Prigg under the state’s 1826 personal liberty law.
March 1, 1842
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Margaret Morgan and her children went back into slavery, and the record loses them after the sale.
Sources: Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part I
Prigg v. Pennsylvania · 1842
State magistrates “may, if they choose, exercise the authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.”
Justice Joseph Story, for the Court, in the same opinion that sent Margaret Morgan back to Maryland
1843
Massachusetts and Vermont bar their judges and jails from fugitive slave cases.
1844
Connecticut passes its own personal liberty law.
1846
New Hampshire follows.
1850 to 1858
After the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, six states pass reinforced personal liberty laws.
When enough governments stop helping, the federal government finds out exactly how much it needed them.
Sources: Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part I
Two abductions, two states that held the authority to respond
One state used what its sovereignty made available. The other filed a lawsuit and watched the federal officials who had violated state law walk away.
The architecture has always been there.
What the scholarship expects
The scholarship on federalism and democratic backsliding has reached a pessimistic consensus: the states lose.
Kaufman, Kelemen and Kolcak
Their comparative study finds federalism works as a guardrail against authoritarian consolidation only under a narrow and hard-to-reach set of conditions.
James Gardner, Publius, 2026
Subnational governments mount initial opposition and meet effective countermeasures, so federalism offers no reliable protection against consolidation.
States get isolated and crushed because they deploy individual tools haphazardly, without recognizing that those tools belong to a unified constitutional architecture.
Sources: Kaufman, Kelemen and Kolcak; Gardner, Publius (2026); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part I
Where the paper sits in the literature
The existing literature theorized Tiers Zero and One. The architecture maps the three tiers it never had occasion to enter.
Rubin and Feeley, 1994
What scholars call federalism is administrative law under another name. Correct for Tiers Zero and One, which the paper treats as the baseline. Tier Two institutions, Tier Three prosecutions and Tier Four regimes are no part of administration.
Kramer, 2000, and Bulman-Pozen, 2014
Political safeguards and partisan competition police the federal-state line. Correct while the parties stay competitive. Autocratic legalism targets exactly those safeguards first, and the architecture operates without them.
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, 2009 and 2010
Uncooperative federalism named the servant’s leverage inside federal programs; Federalism All the Way Down pushed it into juries, school boards, agencies and special-purpose institutions. The paper takes that axis as Tier One and adds the sovereign axis above it.
Huq and Clopton, Texas Law Review, 2026
Agonistic federalism names no-holds-barred intergovernmental conflict and maps its political economy. The paper sorts that conflict into categorical postures and names the structural properties their framework leaves unnamed.
Sources: Rubin and Feeley (1994, 2008); Kramer (2000); Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, Yale L.J. (2009); Gerken, Harv. L. Rev. (2010); Bulman-Pozen (2014); Huq and Clopton, 104 Tex. L. Rev. (2026); Armitage, Part I.5
What the condition is called
The United States “ceased to be a full democracy in the way that Canada, Germany, or even Argentina are democracies.”
Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way and Daniel Ziblatt, Foreign Affairs, December 2025. The same essay says the turn is reversible.
Competitive authoritarianism, the category Levitsky and Way named: elections are held and the opposition campaigns, but the incumbent bends the rules hard enough to almost always win. Such regimes fall when the opposition unites behind one credible candidate and the patronage machine loses the money that keeps the coalition loyal. Economic ties to democracies cap how hard the incumbent can hit back in the meantime.
Hungary · April 12, 2026
53.18%
Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party took 141 of 199 seats against Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, 16 years into a regime built to be unloseable. Turnout was 78.99%, the highest of any Hungarian election since 1990.
Sources: Levitsky, Way and Ziblatt, Foreign Affairs (Dec. 2025); Levitsky at the Harvard Kennedy School (Oct. 2025); Hungarian National Election Office
How the condition is built
Each purge, each captured inspector general, each closed ethics office and each loyalty test shrinks the coalition the leader needs.
Selectorate theory
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith: the size of the coalition a leader needs sets the regime’s character. A democracy needs millions of voters. A dictatorship needs a few hundred generals and oligarchs, kept paid and afraid.
Autocratic legalism
Kim Lane Scheppele, 2018: the autocrat dismantles the constitution by passing laws. Orbán cut university funding and moved two-thirds of public universities into political foundations, which shut them out of EU money. Every step was a signed statute.
Political safeguards depend on the institutions capture targets first. The constitutional infrastructure that keeps working is the part that never depended on them.
Sources: Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook; Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism,” U. Chi. L. Rev. (2018); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Parts I and IV
The vocabulary · 1 of 3 · The taxonomy
A concept without a name stays invisible.
Federal authoritarian capture
The executive acts outside constitutional bounds and the ordinary checks stop working.
Constitutional posture
The position a state takes toward federal authority in one policy domain. There are five.
Tier
A categorical position with its own doctrine, numbered from zero. A state can hold a different tier in every domain.
Cooperative federalism · Tier Zero
The state administers the federal program in good faith, which is most of government in most years.
Uncooperative federalism · Tier One
The state withholds its officers and facilities while staying inside the program. Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, 2009.
Soft secession · Tier Two
Parallel financial infrastructure and safety nets built at the state level, so the state functions whatever the federal government withdraws.
Oppositional federalism · Tier Three
The offensive tier: accountability through the tools of a sovereign state, including state prosecution of federal actors.
Constitutional non-compliance · Tier Four
A competing state legal regime that refuses a federal command exceeding federal authority.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II; Armitage, “Define Your Terms,” The Existentialist Republic (April 15, 2026)
The vocabulary · 2 of 3 · The doctrine
None of this is new doctrine. The contribution is recovery.
Dual sovereignty
Separate sovereigns, each with authority to prosecute the same conduct. Gamble v. United States, 2019.
The pardon limit
Article II reaches “offenses against the United States.” A pardon cannot touch a state conviction. Grossman, 1925.
Anti-commandeering
The federal government cannot conscript state legislatures or officers. Prigg, 1842; New York, 1992; Printz, 1997; Murphy, 2018.
The valid-exercise principle
Federal law is supreme only when made within a granted power. McCulloch, 1819; Article VI, “in pursuance.”
The Neagle-Johnson-Long test
Immunity only when the act was authorized by federal law and no more than necessary and proper. Both prongs must be met.
Interposition
Madison, 1798: a state refuses an unconstitutional federal command while staying in the Union and seeking a remedy.
Nullification
A state’s claim to veto federal law itself. South Carolina, 1832: “null, void, and no law.” The architecture makes no such claim.
Selective enforcement
Laws applied to protect allies and target opponents while the statutes stay the same and the courts stay open.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part III; Armitage, “Define Your Terms” (April 15, 2026)
The vocabulary · 3 of 3 · The structure
One system, assembled and deployed at the same time.
Tier-modularity
The tiers are independent. A state’s posture in one tier implies nothing about any other.
Domain-modularity
Each policy domain is its own strategic space. A tier in immigration implies nothing about healthcare or firearms.
Actor-modularity
Authority is dispersed across every state and local officer with jurisdiction. No one has to coordinate first.
The deployment surface
Tiers times domains times actors. A countermeasure built along one axis holds nothing along the other two.
Political portability
The doctrine does not check which faction is deploying it. Two gun-rights sheriffs built the sanctuary cities’ wall.
The Massachusetts model
Tier Four inside the line: the state withdraws its officers and jails from a command it holds unconstitutional. 1855.
The Wisconsin model
Outside the line: a state court freeing a federal prisoner. In re Booth, 1854, reversed in Ableman v. Booth, 1859.
The servant axis and the sovereign axis
Gerken’s servant power inside federal programs is Tier One. The sovereign’s own authority against federal officers is Tier Three.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Parts I and II; Gerken, “Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,” Harvard Law Review (2010)
Five tiers of state constitutional posture, numbered from zero.
Tier Zero
Cooperative federalism
The state does federal work.
Tier One
Uncooperative federalism
Dissent inside the program: the state withholds its officers and its data.
Tier Two
Soft secession
Exit from the servant role: the state builds what needs no federal partner. The Erie Canal and the Bank of North Dakota are the models.
Tier Three
Oppositional federalism
The sovereign’s own authority, used offensively: state prosecution of federal officers for state crimes, beyond any federal pardon. This is the term I coined.
Tier Four
Constitutional non-compliance
A competing state legal regime: the state refuses a federal command it holds to exceed federal authority. Personal liberty laws, Prohibition repeal, REAL ID, cannabis, the Values Act.
Five categorical positions. A state can hold a different one in every policy domain, and most states sit at Tier Zero in most domains in most years.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II
Tier Zero · Cooperative federalism
The federal government writes the policy. The states make the policy work.
State Medicaid agencies administer Medicaid. State human-services departments administer SNAP. State transportation departments build the federally funded roads. State environmental agencies hold most of the permitting and enforcement authority under federal environmental statutes.
This is the servant role Bulman-Pozen and Gerken described, operating without dissent. The state receives federal funds for administering the program and the federal government receives the state’s administrative capacity. Both pay a price for breaking it.
What the posture costs · SNAP, fall 2025
On October 24, 2025, the Department of Agriculture told states it would not fund November benefits during the shutdown. About two thirds of states had issued partial benefits or none by the time it ended. States that paid full benefits anyway were ordered to undo the payments.
The state carries the administrative burden and holds none of the leverage.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.A; PBS NewsHour and The Hill on the November 2025 SNAP lapse
Tier One · Uncooperative federalism · The record
The federal program stayed on the books every time. What changed was the state’s contribution of its officers and its facilities.
1835
Charleston’s postmaster refused to deliver abolitionist mail. Postmaster General Amos Kendall would neither order delivery nor condemn the refusal.
1843
Massachusetts read Prigg as license and barred its officials from fugitive slave renditions. Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island followed by 1848.
1923
New York repealed the Mullan-Gage Act. Prohibition enforcement fell from about 25,000 state and local officers to about 250 federal agents.
1979
LAPD Special Order 40 barred officers from stopping anyone to ask immigration status or arresting anyone for immigration violations alone.
1985
Berkeley declared itself a sanctuary city in February. San Francisco followed in December, and in 1989 barred city funds from aiding immigration enforcement.
1996
California’s Compassionate Use Act pulled state police out of federal cannabis enforcement while federal law kept cannabis on Schedule I.
2018
More than 500 jurisdictions, from cities to states, had adopted some form of non-cooperation with federal immigration enforcement.
2019
The Ninth Circuit upheld the California Values Act: the federal government cannot commandeer state and local police.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.B; Mikos, Vanderbilt Law Review (2009); United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019)
Tier One · Uncooperative federalism · 2025 to 2026
States withdrew their officers first. In 2026 the fight moved to their databases.
Illinois · 2019
The Keep Illinois Families Together Act bars 287(g) agreements and keeps local police out of federal immigration operations.
Delaware · 2025
HB 182 blocks state agencies from entering federal immigration enforcement agreements.
Maryland · 2025
HB 1222 requires a judicial warrant before immigration officers enter the non-public areas of state and local facilities.
Washington State · 2026
SB 6002 limits license plate reader data collection and bars its use for immigration enforcement.
Maryland · 2026
HB 711 bars the sale of personal data to anyone involved in civil immigration enforcement.
A state declining to hand over its officers and its databases is still inside the federal program. The program continues to exist on paper. The state’s contribution to it has ended. That is Tier One.
The doctrine
New York v. United States (1992), Printz (1997), Murphy v. NCAA (2018) and United States v. California (9th Cir. 2019).
Sources: American Immigration Council, state immigration laws 2025 and 2026; the Illinois, Delaware, Maryland and Washington State legislatures
Tier Two · Soft secession · The record
States build first. The federal apparatus follows.
1817 to 1825
Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill on March 3, 1817, reserving internal improvements to the states. New York authorized $7 million in state bonds and built the Erie Canal, 363 miles from Albany to Buffalo, on state authority alone.
1826 to 1834
Pennsylvania built the Main Line of Public Works, canals and railroads from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. The state system passed 1,200 miles by mid-century.
1911 to 1932
Wisconsin passed the first state workers’ compensation law in 1911 and the first unemployment compensation law on January 28, 1932, which the Social Security Administration calls “the starting point for the federal unemployment insurance program.”
1919
The Bank of North Dakota, the only state-owned general-service bank in the country, holds the state’s deposits by law and earned the state $231.8 million in 2025.
1933
Seventeen control states took over the wholesale distribution of spirits after the Twenty-First Amendment. Pennsylvania’s state stores sent the General Fund $194.6 million in cash in fiscal 2024-25.
1911 to 1967
The United States Postal Savings System took deposits at post offices at 2 percent interest and held $3.4 billion at its 1947 peak. The public banking movement cites it as the federal precedent.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.C; Social Security Administration history; Bank of North Dakota 2025 annual report; Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (Nov. 19, 2025)
Tier Two · The objection and the arithmetic
Several American states have populations and economies many times larger than countries that fund their own safety nets and balance their own books.
$4.25T
California’s 2025 economy, fourth or fifth largest in the world depending on the year and the method.
$2.9T
Texas, eighth in the world, ahead of Russia and Canada.
$2.47T
New York, comparable to Canada’s entire national economy.
5.4M
Norway’s population, with a sovereign wealth fund and a strong safety net. Denmark has 5.9 million people, Finland 5.5 million, Sweden 10.4 million.
Soft secession describes states recognizing they already have the capacity to function as sovereign actors and building the institutional infrastructure to act on it.
Source: Armitage, “Federalism for Anti-Fascists,” The Existentialist Republic (May 2026)
Tier Two · Soft secession · 2025 to 2026
When the Centers for Disease Control stopped being a partner, four states wrote their own vaccine guidance within two weeks.
September 2025 · Public health
California, Oregon, Washington State and Hawaii formed the West Coast Health Alliance and now issue their own vaccine recommendations under state law.
Healthcare
Covered California pays state-funded subsidies when federal premium tax credits are withdrawn, so coverage no longer depends on Congress.
November 2025 · Food
During the SNAP lapse, New York committed $30 million of state money and Pennsylvania moved $5 million to food banks by disaster declaration within days.
Public banking
Bills on the Bank of North Dakota model in six states, Washington State included. My working paper puts a Washington State bank’s 2025 profit at $541 million.
Climate
The U.S. Climate Alliance: 24 governors, about 60 percent of the American economy, coordinating independent of federal action.
Coordination
Governors Safeguarding Democracy, the standing body Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker and Colorado Governor Jared Polis founded in November 2024.
Tier Two is the infrastructure layer under every higher tier.
Sources: Office of Governor Newsom (Sept. 2025); Covered California; CBS News and Pennsylvania DHS on the SNAP lapse; U.S. Climate Alliance; Governors Safeguarding Democracy; Armitage, public bank working paper (Oct. 2026)
Tier Three · Oppositional federalism
The federal badge has never been a categorical exemption from state criminal law.
A state actor with criminal jurisdiction over conduct on state soil holds authority to prosecute a federal official whose conduct violates state law and whose federal accountability mechanisms have refused to act. The case proceeds in state court, under state law, against the official by name, with a sentence state authorities enforce and no pardon the federal executive can sign.
Track one · No new law needed
State assault, homicide, fraud and bribery statutes already reach everyone on state soil. Strip the federal wrapper from the conduct and charge the elements.
Track two · Model legislation
Statutes that fix jurisdiction and define the offenses with specificity, written to apply to everyone so they survive the Supremacy Clause.
Who holds it
Every county prosecutor and every attorney general with jurisdiction over the conduct: more than 2,000 elected prosecutors.
It grows with the offense
An official who tells subordinates to ignore a state grand jury subpoena commits obstruction under state law. Each act of interference is its own charge.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.D; Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024)
Tier Four · Constitutional non-compliance
“Refusing to help is not the same as impeding.”
The Ninth Circuit, adopting the district court’s words, upholding the California Values Act in United States v. California, April 18, 2019. Tier Four is a state’s refusal to administer a federal command it holds to exceed federal constitutional authority, built as a competing legal regime of its own.
Anti-commandeering
Prigg (1842), New York v. United States (1992), Printz (1997) and Murphy (2018): Congress can neither command a state’s officers nor forbid a state from changing its own laws.
The valid-exercise principle
McCulloch (1819): Article VI binds state officials only to federal laws made “in pursuance” of the Constitution. A command beyond federal authority binds no one.
The oath
Article VI, clause 3: state officials swear to support the Constitution itself. The oath obliges them to refuse a command that would have them violate residents’ constitutional rights.
The constraint
Cooper v. Aaron (1958): a state cannot refuse a federal court order enforcing constitutional rights. Tier Four operates before any court rules, and the federal government sues to test the refusal.
Sources: United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.E
Tier Four · Constitutional non-compliance · The record
Tier Four at scale has repealed the federal command itself.
1798
Madison’s Virginia Resolution: against the Alien and Sedition Acts the states “have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose.”
1812
The governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to put their militias under federal command. Martin v. Mott ruled against them in 1827, twelve years after the war.
1855
Massachusetts’s Personal Liberty Act: no state judge as federal commissioner, no state arrest, no state jail, no militia. The 1854 Burns rendition was the last federal success there.
1923 to 1933
By 1928, 28 states had stopped funding Prohibition enforcement, leaving 1,500 federal agents the job of 250,000 state and local officers. Repeal came December 5, 1933.
1994 to 1997
Sheriffs Jay Printz of Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack of Graham County, Arizona, refused Brady Act background checks and won Printz v. United States.
2007 to 2025
Twenty-five states rejected REAL ID by statute or resolution. Federal enforcement began May 7, 2025, twenty years after the act passed.
1996 to 2026
Forty-one states allow medical cannabis and 24 allow adult use against a federal statute that keeps it on Schedule I. The federal government has never tried to compel state enforcement.
2017 to 2019
The California Values Act barred state and local police from immigration enforcement and state jails from civil detainers. The Ninth Circuit upheld it in April 2019.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.E; ACLU (2011) on REAL ID; NCSL state cannabis laws (2026); NPR on REAL ID enforcement (May 2025)
Tier Four · Where it stops
The Massachusetts model operated inside the line. The Wisconsin model operated outside it, and the architecture never claims that ground.
Inside the line · The Massachusetts model
The state withdraws its own officers and jails from a federal command it holds unconstitutional, through facially neutral statutes, before any court has ruled. The federal government keeps the power to enforce with federal means and sues if it disputes the refusal.
The Personal Liberty Act of 1855, the Prohibition repeals of 1923 to 1931, the REAL ID refusals and the California Values Act all sit here.
Outside the line · The Wisconsin model
A state court released a federal prisoner on a state writ in In re Booth, 1854, and Ableman v. Booth reversed it in 1859. South Carolina declared a federal law “null, void, and no law” in 1832. Arkansas defied a federal court order enforcing constitutional rights, and Cooper v. Aaron answered in 1958. A governor claimed to decide alone whether an invasion existed, and Martin v. Mott answered in 1827.
Madison spent the 1830s telling Calhoun’s movement that his interposition of 1798 and their nullification were different things.
Sources: Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Madison’s Report of 1800; Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.E
Tier Three in depth · Dual sovereignty · Gamble v. United States, June 17, 2019
“An offence is defined by a law, and each law is defined by a sovereign. So where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two ‘offences.’”
Justice Samuel Alito, for a 7-2 Court, rejecting an invitation to overrule the doctrine
Federalist 28 · Hamilton
“Power being almost always the rival of power,” the states “will have the same disposition towards the General Government” as it has toward them.
Federalist 51 · Madison
Power “is first divided between two distinct governments,” then among departments. “Hence a double security arises.”
United States v. Lanza · 1922
Double jeopardy does not bar successive state and federal prosecutions, because each sovereign vindicates its own law.
Two centuries of reaffirmation
Houston v. Moore (1820), Bartkus v. Illinois (1959), Heath v. Alabama (1985) and Gamble (2019).
Sources: Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678 (2019); The Federalist Nos. 28 and 51; Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part III.A
Tier Three in depth · The pardon wall
Article II lets the President pardon “offenses against the United States.” A state conviction sits on the other side of that wall.
The United States
A federal charge, in a federal court, under federal law. The President signs a pardon and the federal case ends. Federal declination and the pardon both operate on this side of the wall.
Art. II
The State
A state charge, in a state court, under state law. The prosecutor answers to state voters, the judge sits under state law, the jury sits in a state courthouse, and the state enforces the sentence. The pardon is constitutionally inert here.
Chief Justice Taft, for a unanimous Court in Ex parte Grossman (1925): the words were added “to make clear that the pardon of the President was to operate upon offenses against the United States, as distinguished from offenses against the States.”
Sources: U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.D
Tier Three in depth · The Neagle-Johnson-Long test
Federal officer immunity has two prongs that both must be met, and personal criminal conduct fails both.
The conduct
A federal officer’s act violates state criminal law on state soil.
Prong one
Was the act authorized by federal law?
Prong two
Was it no more than necessary and proper to fulfill the federal duty?
State prosecution proceeds
Removal to federal court changes the courtroom. The federal judge applies this same test.
Immunity attaches
In re Neagle (1890): a deputy marshal under specific federal orders to protect a Justice, who shot the man attacking him.
No
Yes
No
Yes
Johnson v. Maryland (1920), Justice Holmes: a federal employee “does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment.” Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Long (6th Cir. 1988) wrote the two prongs.
Sources: In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920); Kentucky v. Long, 837 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. United States (2025); Armitage, Part III.D
Tier Three in depth · Federal officer removal · 28 U.S.C. § 1442
Every federal defendant will move the case to federal court. Removal changes the courtroom and nothing else.
1
The state prosecutor keeps the case. The charging authority stays where it was.
2
State criminal law still governs the elements. The federal forum applies federal procedure to a state charge.
3
The federal judge decides immunity under the same two-prong test a state judge would apply.
4
A conviction is a state conviction, enforced by state authority and beyond any federal pardon.
The test in use · State of Minnesota v. Morgan
ICE officer Gregory Morgan removed his Hennepin County assault case to federal court on immunity grounds. Judge Nancy Brasel heard evidence on October 9 and 13, and the ruling is pending as of this lecture.
Sources: 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Parts II.D and III.D; Courthouse News and FOX 9 on the Morgan hearing (Oct. 2026)
Tier Three in depth · The record of state prosecutions of federal officers
States have prosecuted federal officers in every period of American history, and no court has ever held that they cannot.
1877
Findley v. Satterfield, Georgia: a federal revenue officer may remove the case to federal court, and the state’s jurisdiction over the conduct stays intact.
1889
Sheriff Thomas Cunningham of San Joaquin County arrested Deputy U.S. Marshal David Neagle for murder on August 14. The prosecution produced In re Neagle.
1906
Pennsylvania prosecuted two soldiers for killing a civilian. The Supreme Court let it proceed: the fatal shot was no “duty imposed by the federal law.”
1920 to 1927
The Prohibition Unit’s own records listed 113 people killed by federal agents by September 16, 1927. States brought prosecutions in 57 of those cases.
1962
Mississippi indicted Chief U.S. Marshal James McShane for inciting a riot after Ole Miss. A federal judge dismissed it on the facts two years later.
1997
Boundary County, Idaho, charged FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi with involuntary manslaughter for shooting Vicki Weaver at Ruby Ridge as she held her infant.
2020
Fairfax County, Virginia, indicted two U.S. Park Police officers for killing Bijan Ghaisar, 25 and unarmed, after federal prosecutors declined to charge.
2026
Hennepin County, Minnesota, charged federal immigration officers Gregory Morgan on April 16 and Christian Castro on May 18, the first such prosecutions of the current enforcement period.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.D; Prohibition Unit records as reported in 1927; Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Hennepin County Attorney’s Office (2026)
Tier Three in depth · Who stopped the prosecutions
Where state prosecutions of federal officers have failed, they have failed because elected state officials decided to stop pursuing them.
Idaho v. Horiuchi · Ruby Ridge
1997: Boundary County charges FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi with involuntary manslaughter.
1998: a federal judge dismisses the case on immunity.
June 5, 2001: the Ninth Circuit, en banc, reverses 6 to 5. The case can go to trial.
September 2001: the newly elected county prosecutor, Brett Benson, moves to drop the charge, and the court grants it.
Virginia v. Vinyard and Amaya · Bijan Ghaisar
November 17, 2017: U.S. Park Police officers shoot Ghaisar, 25 and unarmed. Federal prosecutors decline civil rights charges.
October 15, 2020: Fairfax County indicts both officers for manslaughter.
October 22, 2021: after removal, Judge Claude Hilton dismisses on Supremacy Clause immunity. Attorney General Mark Herring appeals.
April 22, 2022: his successor, Jason Miyares, withdraws the appeal.
The doctrine that authorized both prosecutions remained intact. The architecture functions when state actors choose to use it and falls dormant when they choose not to.
Sources: Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); DCist and Tysons Reporter on the Ghaisar case (2020 to 2022); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.D
Tier Three in depth · Hennepin County, 2026
Mary Moriarty charged two federal immigration officers under Minnesota law. The federal answer has been to withhold the evidence in the third case.
Gregory Morgan · April 16
Two counts of second-degree assault for pointing his service weapon at two cars on Highway 62 on February 5, driving back to end his shift. The case moved to federal court, where Judge Nancy Brasel heard evidence October 9 and 13.
Christian Castro · May 18
Four felony assault counts and one count of falsely reporting a crime for shooting Julio Sosa-Celis on January 14. Governor Abbott never signed the extradition warrant; Texas released him at 90 days. Bail was set at $200,000 at his September 17 appearance in Minnesota.
Renée Good · January 7
ICE agent Jonathan Ross has not been charged. On September 10 the U.S. Attorney told Moriarty that evidence sharing was paused indefinitely. Minnesota is suing for the rest, Ross’s phone included.
Operation Metro Surge · 17 incidents
Seventeen incidents from the operation are under county investigation, with the Minnesota Attorney General in support. Moriarty leaves office in January 2027. The authority stays with the office.
The doctrine was ready in 1920. The prosecutor arrived in 2026, and every county in this room has one with the same authority.
Sources: Hennepin County Attorney’s Office; Minnesota Attorney General (May 18, 2026); Courthouse News; FOX 9; The Spokesman-Review (Oct. 22, 2026). Update the status the morning of the talk.
Tier Three · Track two in 2026 · Model legislation and the courts
Facially neutral statutes survive. Statutes that single out federal officers fall. In 2026 the courts proved the paper’s second-track rule.
California AB 1806 · Sept. 29, 2026
Requires the state’s prosecutor to investigate shootings by immigration officers that kill unarmed civilians, and permits prosecution where state law was broken.
California SB 747 · Sept. 29, 2026
The No Kings Act creates a state cause of action against any officer, federal agents included, for constitutional violations, retroactive to March 1, 2025.
Illinois Public Act 104-0440 · Dec. 9, 2025
The Illinois Bivens Act and a 1,000-foot courthouse arrest buffer, with $10,000 statutory damages. The Justice Department sued on December 22, 2025; no ruling yet.
California SB 627 · Blocked Feb. 9, 2026
The mask ban for federal agents was enjoined because it treated federal officers differently from state officers.
California SB 805 · Struck Oct. 14, 2026
A unanimous Ninth Circuit panel held the No Vigilantes Act’s identification requirement for federal agents violates the Supremacy Clause.
Washington State SB 5855 · March 19, 2026
Bans face coverings for every officer in the state, federal included, and lets anyone detained by a masked officer sue. Written to cover all officers, which avoids the defect that sank California’s ban.
Sources: CalMatters (Sept. 29, 2026); Courthouse News (Oct. 14, 2026); Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, United States v. Illinois; Washington State Standard (March 19, 2026); Armitage, Part II.D
The doctrine
Each tier rests on a different body of settled law, and the doctrines do not collapse into each other.
Doctrine
Where it comes from
Reaffirmed
Carries
Dual sovereignty and the pardon limit
Houston v. Moore (1820); Article II, Section 2
Lanza (1922), Bartkus (1959), Heath (1985), Gamble (2019); Grossman (1925)
Tier Three
Anti-commandeering
Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), Justice Story
New York (1992), Printz (1997), Murphy (2018), United States v. California (2019)
Tiers One and Four
The valid-exercise principle
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice Marshall
Lopez (1995) and NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)
Tiers Two and Four
The limit of officer immunity
In re Neagle (1890)
Johnson (1920), Long (1988), Horiuchi (2001), Martin (2025)
Tier Three
State constitutional law
The new judicial federalism, Justice Brennan (1977)
Lunn v. Commonwealth (Mass. 2017) and the post-Dobbs state cases
Every tier
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part III
The doctrine · Anti-commandeering
The wall two gun-rights sheriffs built against a federal gun law is the wall every sanctuary city stands on today.
1842 · Story · Prigg
State magistrates “may, if they choose, exercise the authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.”
1992 · O’Connor · New York
The Constitution “has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”
1997 · Scalia · Printz
The federal government may not “command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”
2018 · Alito · Murphy
A federal law that forbids a state from changing its own laws commandeers the state’s legislature just as surely as a command to act.
Sheriff Jay Printz of Ravalli County, Montana, and Sheriff Richard Mack of Graham County, Arizona, refused to perform the Brady Act’s background checks and sued in 1994. Two county officers, acting alone, produced the doctrine that protects every state and local refusal of federal commandeering in the country.
Sources: Prigg, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018)
The doctrine · The valid-exercise principle
Article VI binds state officials to federal laws made “in pursuance” of the Constitution, and to nothing else.
McCulloch v. Maryland · 1819
Chief Justice Marshall: federal action inside an Article I grant is the supreme law of the land. Outside it, the state keeps plenary authority and the Supremacy Clause has nothing to invoke.
Lopez · 1995 and Morrison · 2000
The Court narrowed the Commerce Clause to economic activity. Each narrowing enlarged the space in which states retain plenary authority to build their own institutions.
NFIB v. Sebelius · 2012
Chief Justice Roberts: a federal spending condition cannot be “a gun to the head” of a state’s regulatory choices. The Medicaid expansion stayed an offer the states could decline.
The hinge
Tier One refuses to cooperate inside a federal program it treats as valid. Tier Four refuses a command it holds to exceed federal authority. McCulloch decides which posture a state is in.
This principle is Tier Two’s foundation. The Bank of North Dakota invokes no federal authority and depends on no federal cooperation, so the federal banking system has nothing to preempt. Covered California occupies state regulatory ground the federal exchange never displaced.
Sources: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); United States v. Lopez (1995); United States v. Morrison (2000); NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Armitage, Part III.C
The doctrine · Political portability
The constitutional doctrines that authorize state opposition to federal authoritarian capture were built by conservative jurisprudence for unrelated purposes.
Justice Story · 1842
Anti-commandeering’s origin, in the opinion that returned Margaret Morgan to slavery.
Chief Justice Taft · 1925
The pardon limit, explained in a case about criminal contempt.
Justice O’Connor · 1992
Anti-commandeering for state legislatures, over radioactive waste.
Justice Scalia · 1997
Anti-commandeering for state officers, to protect two sheriffs from a gun law.
Chief Justice Roberts · 2012
Anti-coercion under the Spending Clause, against the Medicaid expansion.
Justice Alito · 2018 and 2019
Anti-commandeering over sports gambling; dual sovereignty against a double jeopardy challenge.
The doctrine does not check which faction is deploying it. Whoever endorses immigration sanctuaries has endorsed firearms sanctuaries on the same ground, and the reverse.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part III.F and the abstract
The structure · Three properties and what they produce
Together the three properties produce a deployment surface the federal apparatus cannot consolidate and cannot neutralize through any single line of countermeasures.
Tier-modularity
The tiers are independent of one another. Wisconsin’s legislature repealed its Prohibition enforcement statute in 1929 and went straight to Tier Four in that domain, with no stop at any lower tier, while cooperating on everything else.
Domain-modularity
Each policy domain is a separate strategic space. California in 2026 holds Tier One in immigration sanctuary policy, Tier Two through Covered California, Tier Three through its prosecutors and Tier Four through the Values Act, at the same time.
Actor-modularity
Authority is dispersed across every officer who holds jurisdiction. Sheriff Cunningham in 1889 and Sheriffs Printz and Mack in 1994 each acted alone from a county office, and each produced doctrine the whole architecture now rests on.
The deployment surface
Tiers times domains times actors. A federal apparatus prepared against any single axis holds no comparable countermeasures along the other two, and the surface scales with the product of the three.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.F and Sections II.G through II.I
The structure · Tier-modularity
The federal lawyer walks into four courtrooms with one brief, and in three of them the brief does nothing.
Courtroom one · Tier One
A sanctuary statute withholding state police from immigration enforcement. The brief says the Supremacy Clause requires cooperation. Printz answers it.
Courtroom two · Tier Two
The Bank of North Dakota. The brief against non-cooperation does nothing: the bank sits inside no federal program and invokes no federal authority.
Courtroom three · Tier Three
A Hennepin County indictment of a federal officer. The brief against parallel infrastructure does nothing: the prosecutor invokes Gamble.
Courtroom four · Tier Four
The California Values Act. The brief against a criminal prosecution does nothing: the statute regulates the state’s own officers under the Tenth Amendment.
A countermeasure that narrows anti-commandeering does nothing to dual sovereignty. A broader preemption doctrine does nothing to infrastructure outside federal program territory. A broader reading of the pardon power does nothing to a state’s refusal to lend its officers. A narrower Tenth Amendment does nothing to a county prosecutor’s charging authority. The doctrines have not collapsed into each other in two centuries of federal pressure.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Section II.G
The structure · Domain-modularity · Four states in 2026
Four tiers at once inside a single state, with no tier requiring the others to function.
State
Tier Zero
Tier One
Tier Two
Tier Three
Tier Four
California
Banking, customs, census, mails
Sanctuary laws: no police, no jails
Covered California, state subsidies
AB 1806 and every county prosecutor
The Values Act, upheld 2019
New York
Most federal programs
Immigration sanctuary policy
State-funded health programs
Attorney general, undeployed
Shield laws
Texas
Health, environment, education, roads
Varies by directive
ERCOT, outside federal ratemaking
Available, undeployed
Second Amendment sanctuary
Washington State
Most federal programs
Keep Washington Working Act, 2019; SB 6002, 2026
West Coast Health Alliance, 2025
SB 5855 suits; no prosecutions yet
Initiative 502: cannabis legal since 2012
The federal apparatus has to analyze each state’s position in each domain as a separate question: fifty states, four operative tiers, every occupied domain and every actor with jurisdiction.
Sources: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Sections II.H and V; the California, New York, Texas and Washington State records cited on earlier slides
The structure · Domain-modularity · Eight domains
Article I confers federal authority piecemeal, domain by domain.
Domain
Where federal authority comes from
What the state keeps
Immigration
The Naturalization Clause and foreign affairs
Its police, its jails, its records, its data
Healthcare
Commerce Clause and Spending Clause programs
Its own exchange and its own subsidies
Firearms
Commerce Clause, limited by Lopez
Intrastate regulation in either direction
Cannabis
Commerce Clause as read in Gonzales v. Raich
Legalization, with no duty to enforce federal law
Electrical grid
Federal Power Act, interstate lines only
Intrastate grids, which is what ERCOT is
Education
Spending Clause conditions on federal money
Curriculum, admissions, records, funding
Environment
Federal environmental statutes and treaties
Stricter state standards and state permits
Elections
Elections Clause, federal races only
Registration, polling, counting, certification
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Section II.H
The structure · Actor-modularity
About 500,000 elected state and local officials, each holding tools across the tiers, are the deployment surface.
State constitutional officers
Governor, attorney general, legislature, state supreme court
County officers
More than 2,000 elected prosecutors, the sheriffs, county boards and clerks
Municipal officers
Mayors, city councils, police chiefs, public health officers
Sub-municipal institutions
School boards, special districts, university regents, election boards
Individual officials in their roles
The officer who declines a detainer and the clerk who records the license: thinner doctrinal cover, the same jurisdiction
A countermeasure aimed at attorneys general leaves more than 2,000 elected county prosecutors untouched.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Section II.I
The structure · Actor-modularity · The governor
The governor is an entire deployment surface in one office.
1 · State police and bureaus of investigation
Statewide arrest and investigative authority, parallel to the FBI.
2 · Corrections
The chokepoint for federal detainers and detention requests.
3 · Professional licensing
Federal officials in regulated professions hold state licenses.
4 · Revenue and taxation
Federal officials are state tax residents, with the audits that implies.
5 · Regulatory agencies
Environment, labor, consumer protection, securities, insurance, utilities.
6 · Emergency powers
Suspend statutes, redirect agencies, redirect funds, restrict state property.
7 · Pardon and clemency
The counterweight to federal retaliation against state actors.
8 · Appointments
Agency heads, boards, regents, judicial vacancies; it compounds across a term.
9 · The National Guard under Title 32
State status, state purposes, until lawfully federalized.
10 · Veto and executive orders
Tier One refusals and Tier Two builds at speed, without a session.
11 · Public communication
The governor’s refusal creates the political space other actors use.
The consequence
A countermeasure aimed at emergency powers does nothing about pardons, licensing, taxation or the Guard.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Section II.I
The structure · The deployment surface
The pessimists measured state opposition one tool at a time. The architecture operates along three axes at once.
Actors
5 tiers
Domains
Tier-modularity gives each tier its own doctrinal foundation and its own resistance to countermeasures built for other tiers. Domain-modularity gives each policy domain a strategic space of its own. Actor-modularity disperses the authority across every state and local officer with jurisdiction.
A federal apparatus prepared against any single axis holds no comparable countermeasures along the other two, and the surface scales with the product of the three axes.
Fifty states, four operative tiers, every occupied domain, half a million officials.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.F and the Conclusion
The record · 2025 to 2026 · The deployment is happening at scale
The architecture is no longer theoretical. State actors are deploying it, and the federal apparatus has been unable to reverse the results.
54
Lawsuits California Attorney General Rob Bonta filed in the administration’s first year. The 100th came October 15, 2026, over ICE arrests at courthouses.
35
Preliminary injunctions and other emergency orders in that first year, with 12 final rulings and about $188 billion in funding protected.
6 to 3
Trump v. Illinois, December 23, 2025: the Supreme Court refused to let a federalized Guard execute the laws in Illinois. Eight days later the administration gave up control of California’s Guard.
2
Federal immigration officers charged under state law in Hennepin County, with 17 incidents under investigation and the attorney general in support.
“The Government has failed to identify a source of authority that would allow the military to execute the laws in Illinois.”
The Supreme Court, Trump v. Illinois, reading “regular forces” in 10 U.S.C. § 12406 to mean the United States military. Letitia James, Keith Ellison, Dana Nessel, Phil Weiser and Kris Mayes led or joined the parallel multistate litigation.
Sources: California Department of Justice (Jan. 20 and Oct. 15, 2026); Trump v. Illinois, No. 25A443 (Dec. 23, 2025); Hennepin County Attorney’s Office; Armitage, Part IV
Ten objections · 1 of 2
Each objection at full strength, and the answer the paper gives to it.
“The Supremacy Clause shields federal officers.”
Martin v. United States (2025) called the categorical-shield reading “misplaced.” The two-prong Neagle-Johnson-Long test governs, and personal criminal conduct fails both prongs.
“This is nullification in modern dress.”
Tier Four withdraws the state’s own cooperation, inside the anti-commandeering doctrine of Printz and Murphy, and claims no veto over federal law.
“Federal prosecutors declined, so the state cannot act.”
Gamble: two sovereigns, two laws, two offenses. Federal declination forecloses nothing on the state side of the divide.
“Federal officers are immune for anything on duty.”
Immunity attaches only when the act was authorized by federal law and no more than necessary and proper to the duty. The objection collapses two prongs into one.
“Courts will not hear it: political question, no standing.”
No tier needs a court’s leave to deploy; the federal government must sue. Massachusetts v. EPA settled state standing, and Bonta has filed 100 suits.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part IV.5, objections A through E
Ten objections · 2 of 2
Two practical objections and three judicial ones.
“No state will actually do it.”
California holds four tiers at once, Hennepin County charged two officers, Texas built ERCOT, and Washington State unmasked every officer in the state.
“Generalize it across the states and it destabilizes the Union.”
It deploys only where federal authority is contested. California stays at Tier Zero in banking, customs, the census and the mails.
“Trump v. United States immunizes every federal officer.”
The holding is about the President, and the Court has extended it to no one else. Federalist 69 leaves even the President “liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.”
“An originalist Court will undo the doctrine.”
Printz, Murphy, Gamble and NFIB are the originalist Court’s own work, each grounded in the founding structure, and Gamble rejected an explicit invitation to overrule.
“Cooper v. Aaron forbids it.”
Cooper bars defying a federal court order that enforces constitutional rights. Tier Four acts before any order exists, and the refusal invites the suit that produces one.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part IV.5, objections F through J
Objection · “This is the Confederate position in modern dress.”
South Carolina declared the tariffs “null, void, and no law.” Tier Four makes no claim of that kind, and the two postures differ on four structural points.
1
Tier Four withdraws the state’s own institutional cooperation and claims no veto over federal law for other states or for the federal government’s own operations.
2
It operates inside the modern anti-commandeering doctrine the Court has built since 1992. The Confederate posture predated that doctrine and claimed a veto the Court has never recognized.
3
It claims doctrinal authority to refuse commands the constitutional structure does not authorize. The Confederate posture claimed moral authority to protect slavery.
4
It operates alongside full Tier Zero cooperation on customs, the mails, banking regulation and monetary policy. The Confederate posture rejected federal authority broadly, to the point of secession.
Anyone who treats the two as one posture conflates a doctrine the modern Court has built across three decades of decisions with a constitutional theory that has had no doctrinal life since 1865.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part IV.5.B; South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification (1832)
Objection · “The Supremacy Clause is a categorical shield.”
The Court’s own reading of the clause is narrow and fact-bound, governed by the necessary-and-proper inquiry. A unanimous Court said so in June 2025.
Martin v. United States · 2025
Justice Gorsuch, for a unanimous Court: the Supremacy Clause gives the federal government no affirmative defense in tort suits, and the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Neagle for a broader shield was “misplaced.”
The test the objection skips
Neagle (1890), Johnson (1920), Long (1988): immunity only when the act was authorized by federal law and no more than necessary and proper. The objection collapses two prongs into one question, whether the conduct happened on duty.
The wrong posture
Trump v. United States (2024) is federal-to-federal: the federal government’s own prosecutorial authority over a former President. It says nothing about a state prosecuting a federal officer for a state crime.
What Martin leaves alone
Martin is a tort case, on a different axis from criminal prosecution, and it leaves Neagle where it was for the criminal context. The paper claims only what it confirms: no categorical shield.
The state files charges for conduct that fails both prongs. The federal defense operates inside the test, and the clause extends no protection beyond it.
Sources: Martin v. United States (2025); In re Neagle (1890); Johnson v. Maryland (1920); Kentucky v. Long (6th Cir. 1988); Armitage, Part IV.5.A and D
Objection · “Trump v. United States immunizes the whole federal apparatus.”
The President “would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.”
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 69, distinguishing the President from the British king. The founders’ answer to whether any office carries immunity from law was no.
The holding’s scope
Absolute immunity for the President’s core constitutional acts, presumptive for other official acts. The decision’s textual scope is the President, and the Court has extended it to no one else.
Official acts
State assault, homicide, fraud and corruption statutes define no “official act.” Conduct that violates state criminal law gains no official character from the badge of whoever committed it.
The Court’s own method
Bruen (2022), joined by the Chief Justice: interpretation follows the understanding at ratification, because “times have changed” but “the Constitution hasn’t.” Federalist 69 is that understanding.
The OLC memos
The 1973 and 2000 Justice Department memos bind federal prosecutors and no court has adopted them. Kim Wehle: they “have no force of law and could be overturned by the attorney general at any time.”
Sources: Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024); The Federalist No. 69; N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022); Armitage, Part IV.5.H and Part II.D
Objection · “The federal government will retaliate, and no state will risk it.”
The objection names a real institutional dynamic and produces no doctrinal limit. Every channel of retaliation meets a rule the Court has already written.
Funding
NFIB v. Sebelius (2012): a federal condition cannot be “a gun to the head.” Bonta’s first-year litigation protected about $188 billion the federal government tried to withdraw.
Preemption
Preemption operates inside valid federal authority. Statutes in domains of state primacy survive it, as the Massachusetts laws did from 1855 and the REAL ID refusals from 2007.
Federal charges against state officials
A federal obstruction charge requires the underlying federal command to be lawful, and the same two-prong test constrains federal prosecution of state officers for official conduct.
Will
The incentives shifted as federal action intensified. State actors who fail to deploy now face costs the deployment forecloses, which is why 2026 looks the way the record shows.
The Castro case shows the countermeasures in practice: a governor who sat on an extradition warrant for 90 days, and a federal false-statements indictment filed before the state trial could begin. The state case is proceeding anyway.
Sources: NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); California Department of Justice (Jan. 20, 2026); Minnesota Attorney General (2026); Armitage, Part IV.5.F and G
The limits
The architecture has limits worth naming, and both of them are about the same thing.
It does not reach federal action with no state cooperation surface.
A federal agency that operates through federal personnel, on federal property, under federal funding and federal law, with no point at which state police, state permits, state administrative capacity or state criminal jurisdiction touch the action, sits outside the architecture’s reach.
It does not protect state actors who decline to deploy the authority they hold.
A state attorney general who chooses not to investigate federal officers for state-law crimes against state residents holds the same constitutional authority as any other. The attorney general holds it in full and has chosen to leave it unused.
Tier-modularity, domain-modularity and actor-modularity describe constitutional capacity. They do not produce political will.
Source: Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.F
What we learned
What reads as legal impossibility is usually political choice.
Oregon held the jurisdiction in 2020 and charged no one; Pennsylvania held it in 1839 and convicted. States prosecuted federal agents 57 times in the 1920s. An en banc court voted 6 to 5 in 2001 to let the Horiuchi case proceed, and a prosecutor dropped it three months later. A judge dismissed the Ghaisar indictment in 2021, and an attorney general withdrew the appeal in 2022. Hennepin County charged two officers in 2026. Every failure in that list was a decision by an elected official who had the legal authority to act and chose not to.
We have been leaving the tools on the table. Until that inaction starts costing them elections, they will largely remain unchanged.
Source: Armitage, “Federalism for Anti-Fascists,” The Existentialist Republic (May 2026); Armitage, Oppositional Federalism, Part II.D
The ask
The question for your state is which tier it is sitting on, and what it would take to move it up one.
To your county prosecutor
Does your office hold jurisdiction over federal officers who commit state crimes against our neighbors, and will you use it?
To your attorney general and governor
Will you refuse cooperation with federal agencies that violate constitutional rights, and what specific steps protect residents if federal benefits are cut?
To your legislators
Will you support legislation to create a state public bank, and will you file the statutes that fix jurisdiction over federal officer conduct?
To your governor
Will you join the multi-state compacts other governors have already built?
Ask questions that require specific answers. Staff sort identical messages into a single tally, so form letters get counted once; use your own words, about your own life.
Questions
Christopher Armitage
Publisher, The Existentialist Republic
Owner and Editor in Chief, Gavel Grab
theexistentialistrepublic.com · gavelgrab.org · ChristopherArmitage.com
The paper, free on SSRN
Tier Zero
Cooperative federalism
Tier One
Uncooperative federalism
Tier Two
Soft secession
Tier Three
Oppositional federalism
Tier Four
Constitutional non-compliance
Oppositional Federalism: A Taxonomy of State Constitutional Postures Under Authoritarian Capture · ssrn.com/abstract=6416178